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Introduction
Emissions of carbon dioxide and nitrogen oxide have increased with economic growth all over the world since the Industrial Revolution, irrespective of the economic system in place. Among others, the consumption of petroleum and coal, which are the main sources of environmental pollution, has rapidly expanded with an improvement in the worldwide standard of living since World War II.
Emissions of carbon dioxide cause global warming by the greenhouse effect, and emissions of nitrogen oxide cause air pollution via exhausts from, for example, automobiles, boilers, factories, and thermal power stations, etc. Consequently, the deterioration of earth's environment has been steady, with a rise in temperatures, a rapid reduction in glaciers, and a rise in the sea level.
Greenhouse gas emissions are now a serious environmental problem.
In recent decades, there has been policy focus on the environment with policymakers devising various instruments to alter economic agents' behaviors to control environmental degradation. In order to overcome this problem, governments employ various policies such as direct controls and auctioned marketable emissions permits, emissions subsidies, and emissions taxes to control pollution (see, for example, Downing and White (1986) , Milliman and Prince (1989) , Jung, Krutilla and Boyd (1996) , and Requate and Unold (2003) ).
With pollution continuing to be a global problem, the success of these policy initiatives is debatable.
Researchers have also devoted considerable efforts to recommend and evaluate various initiatives by using various theoretical and empirical approaches. Among theoretical approaches, multi-stage game models (see, for example, Downing and White (1986) , Milliman and Prince (1989) , Goto (2014, 2016) , Poyago-Theotoky (2007 , 2010 , Youssef and Dinar (2011) ) and other methodologies have been used. 1 In these papers, competitive or oligopolistic profit-maximizing firms are assumed. The following papers, on the other hand, extend conventional models to an analytical framework including nonprofit-maximizing (public) firms.
There are, for example, Bárcena-Ruiz and Garzon (2006) , Gil-Molto and Varvarigos (2014) , Kato (2011) , and Pal and Saha (2014) addressing the problem of emissions abatement in mixed oligopoly models, with public firms and private firms. Among others, Bárcena-Ruiz and Garzon (2006) employ two-stage game models of a mixed oligopoly and compare market performance in the mixed and private oligopolies, showing that environmental taxes are lower in the mixed oligopoly than in the private oligopoly and that the decision of the government whether to privatize a public firm interacts with the environmental policy. Gil-Molto and Varvarigos (2014) , on the other hand, demonstrate that the comparative-static results are affected by the number of firms when firms simultaneously determine outputs and emissions (abatement) under a mixed oligopoly and a private oligopoly. A common feature of Bárcena-Ruiz and Garzon (2006) , Gil-Molto and Varvarigos (2014) , Kato (2011) , and Pal and Saha (2014) approaches is that public and private firms choose output and emissions (abatement) levels in the same stage. Therefore, the roles of emissions abatement technology and the relationship between its technology and emissions taxes are not sufficiently discussed. They do not, for example, refer to spillovers in the development of pollution abatement technology. We take R&D spillovers into consideration.
We examine the interaction and behavior of firms in a mixed oligopoly and the effect of their R&D efforts by separating the timing of decision-making of firms on output and emissions (abatement) into two. The regulator (government) implements a tax on emissions of pollution, and firms can counter these payments by engaging in environmental R&D efforts to abate emissions. Hence, we use a three-stage, mixed oligopoly model, where a public firm and a private firm non-cooperatively determine their R&D to control pollution emissions to maximize social welfare and profits in the first stage, the regulator sets an emissions tax rate (or emissions subsidy rate) to maximize social welfare in the second stage, and firms simultaneously determine outputs to maximize social welfare and profits without cooperation in the final stage, respectively (see, for example, Requate (2005) for a survey of the related literature). We assume externalities for R&D returns as well as for pollution emissions. 2 Thus, our consideration, while still based in a stylized setting, seems more realistic, besides adding to the extant literature.
With regard to papers with the three-stage game model with environmental R&D, there are Poyago-Theotoky (2007) and Youssef and Dinar (2011) . 3 These analyses shed light on the behavior of conventional oligopolies (not mixed 2 Bárcena-Ruiz and Garzon (2006), Gil-Molto and Varvarigos (2014) , and Kato (2011) do not take spillovers in pollution abatement technology into consideration. In addition, Youssef and Dinar (2011) assume that there are no R&D externalities between firms. 3 Besides, Katsoulacos and Xepapadeas (1996) consider the tax-R&D subsidy policy mix, where the government implements in stage one of a three-stage game private duopoly model. oligopolies). In Youssef and Dinar (2011) , a regulator chooses both emissions taxes and R&D subsidies in the first-stage, and it is shown that R&D investment is taxed, not subsidized, when the marginal damage cost of pollution is sufficiently high. Poyago-Theotoky (2007) examine and compare two organization regimes of competitive environmental R&D and an environmental R&D cartel (ERC), and show that environmental R&D, which firms choose in the first stage, is higher in the ERC than in non-ERC for small damages and for large damages when R&D is efficient. In the context of the literature, we consider the optimal tax policy of the government and environmental R&D efforts and outputs of a public firm and a private firm in the presence of R&D spillovers.
Mixed oligopolies are prevalent in many nations where governments partially privatize some sectors and allow private firms to enter markets for power generation, telecommunications, postal and banking services, railway, mining, university education, military production, etc. In such markets, both public and private firms coexist, albeit with differing objectives.
We shed light on government's pollution abatement policy, and firms' environmental R&D behavior and the effect of their R&D on emissions taxes, outputs, and emissions in a mixed duopoly. For our analysis, we invoke Poyago-Theotoky's (2007) model in order to investigate the behavior of the government and a mixed duopoly when their productive activities pollute the environment. 4 Specifically a three-stage game model is employed in order to consider the behavior of the mixed duopoly under pollution control and environmental R&D and seek a sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium. Further, we examine the effects of privatization of a public firm by comparing the results derived under two regimes of a private duopoly and a mixed duopoly and investigate whether different ownership forms affect industry performance and pollution emissions. Consequently, differences in equilibria of the mixed and private oligopolies will be clarified.
We show that a public firm in a mixed duopoly could perform environmental R&D, but a private firm may or may not, i.e., there could exist a corner solution in the environmental R&D stage. This apparently differs from results in a threestage game model of private duopoly and in two-stage game models of mixed oligopoly. The outputs of the public and private firms depend on total R&D efforts and are the same. It is, furthermore, obtained that an emissions tax could be negative (i.e., the optimal policy of the government is to subsidize). It is shown that the comparisons of emissions taxes, outputs, and total emissions before and after privatization depend just on the comparison of environmental R&Ds before and after: Privatization causes less environmental R&Ds and less outputs (consumer surplus) and more net emissions in comparison with non-privatization, so that it worsens the environment. Privatization as a policy to improve the environment is not desirable. This revelation is obviously important and could use additional validation, both theoretically and empirically.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section we present a three-stage game model of mixed duopoly and investigate the output and environmental R&D behavior of a public firm and a private firm and the emissions tax choice of the government. In Section 3 we consider the effects of privatization of a public firm by comparing results in a mixed duopoly and a privatized duopoly, and the final section concludes.
Model and analysis of a mixed duopoly
In the mixed duopoly model we consider, there are a public firm and a private firm producing a homogeneous product. We start with a linear inverse demand function for simplicity: p = a − Q, a > 0, where p is the output price, Q = q 0 + q 1 is the total output, and a is the size of the market. The public firm is denoted by subscript 0, and the private firm by subscript 1. 5 Production costs for both firms are quadratic and symmetric, and denoted by the production cost function of The social planner (government) commits to environmental tax policy to control emissions, such that t = tax (subsidy) rate per unit of pollution emissions. The emissions tax is introduced to correct pollution externality. Environmental R&D spending on pollution abatement enables firms to reduce tax payments.
Emissions taxes have the effect of an intervention in the market as well. With this basic setup, we proceed with the formal model.
2A. Partial privatization of the market
In the mixed duopoly of quantity-setting Cournot type, firms have different objectives, with the public firm maximizing social welfare and the private firm maximizing profits, each choosing its environmental R&D and output. The government also plays a positive role in abating pollution via a tax/subsidy policy.
The sequence of decisions can be envisioned in three steps: In the first stage 7 Youssef and Dinar (2011) assume that there are no spillovers on R&D performance between private firms. Fischer and Newell (2008) assume the R&D spillover rate to be 0.5 in their numerical analysis. On the other hand, Milliman and Prince (1989) take the diffusion of the new technology across firms into consideration and evaluate environmental policy instruments. Their diffusion corresponds to full spillovers, i.e., a research joint venture. 8 A similar assumption is employed by, for example, Chiou and Hu (2001) , and Katsoulacos and Xepapadeas (1996) . According to the behavioral principle of firms, the assumption that net emissions are positive is reasonable.
9 Bárcena-Ruiz and Garzon (2006) 
both the public firm and the private firm simultaneously choose their environmental R&D (or pollution abatement) effort levels without abatement cooperation, in the second stage the government sets a tax or a subsidy to reduce emissions generated by production activities, and in the final stage they simultaneously choose their outputs without collusion. With this recognition, the game model is solved by backward recursion.
The profit function of firm i is given by:
The profit function includes revenues minus production costs, taxes on net emissions, and environmental research (R&D) expenditures. The social welfare function of the public firm is given by:
where Q = q 0 + q 1 . The social welfare function is the sum of consumer surplus, profits, emissions tax revenues, minus the environmental damage. The public firm internalizes pollution emissions, but need not pay an emissions tax, unlike the private firm.
I. Output choice -stage three
As the public firm and the private firm engage in Cournot-type quantity competition in the third stage, the first-order condition for social welfare maximization of the public firm is:
(1) The public firm chooses output such that output price equals the sum of marginal costs of both production and environmental damage. An emissions tax never influences the marginal costs. On the other hand, the first-order condition for profit maximization of the private firm is:
The second-order conditions for both firms are satisfied, and the equilibrium of the output market is locally stable. An increased (declined) emissions tax increases (decreases) the marginal costs of the private firm, consequently reducing (increasing) its output. From the first-order conditions (1) and (2), given t and z , we have the respective outputs:
where z = z 0 + z 1 is total pollution abatement. Given different underlying objectives, the firms have somewhat different output responses to changes in parameters. For instance, with higher emissions taxes, the public firm increases its output, but the private firm does not; and with greater total pollution abatement, the public firm increases its output, but the private firm does not. The effects of spillovers on outputs of both firms are reverse as well. Finally, increased emissions taxes lead to a reduction in total output (consequently, total emissions).
II. Tax choice -stage two
In the second stage, the government chooses an emissions tax in order to maximize social welfare. The government now internalizes pollution emissions like the public firm. The first-order condition for social welfare maximization of the government is (using (3)):
where ∂W / ∂q 0 = 0 and ∂W / ∂t = 0. Now, the second-order condition is satisfied.
So, it follows from (4) that, given z , the government sets an emissions tax rate such as:
The government may have an incentive to increase output through an emissions subsidy even if the social assessment of the pollution damage is less severe. It, on the other hand, follows from (5) that dt / dz = − 4d(1+ β ) / (3 + 2d) < 0 . The government could adopt a policy to increase output such as a reduction in emissions taxes or a rise in emission subsidies, because an increase in environmental R&D effort decreases the amount of social damage due to pollution.
This shows that the mixed oligopoly incurs the same effect as the private oligopoly (see, for example, Poyago-Theotoky (2007)). Whether the government levies an emissions tax or provides an emissions subsidy depends significantly on the degree of total pollution abatement due to environmental R&D efforts, the seriousness of environmental damage, and R&D spillovers. Meanwhile, the efficiency of R&D technology has no direct impact on the emissions tax.
When substituting (5) into (3), we get the outputs of the public and private firms:
The output levels also depend on the degree of total pollution abatement due to environmental R&D efforts, the seriousness of environmental damage, and R&D spillovers. Particularly, environmental R&D leads to the same increase in both firms' outputs, dq i / dz = d(1+ β ) / (3 + 2d) > 0 , because an increase in its R&D causes emissions taxes (subsidies) to reduce (raise). We find the following lemma:
Lemma 1. The public and private firms produce the same outputs for any total pollution abatement. 10
The outputs of the public and private firms become the same when R&D is determined endogenously. Although this latter result is normal or standard for a private oligopoly with the same production technology, it is not necessarily general that firms with different objectives (as in a mixed oligopoly considered here) produce the same outputs. 11
III. R&D choice: stage one
In the first stage, firms choose their pollution abatement levels to maximize social welfare and profits by engaging in R&D, respectively. Now, when we employ Lemma 1, the social welfare and profit functions of the public and private firms are reduced to, respectively:
When we take (1), (2), and (4) into consideration, the first-order conditions for social welfare and profit maximization are given by, respectively:
10 Bárcena- Ruiz and Garzon (2006) show that the output of a public firm is different from the output of each private firm in a mixed oligopoly by using a two-stage game model and also that the public firm may not produce output, depending on the number of private firms. On the other hand, Kato (2011) mentions that a public firm produces more than a private firm by taking more abatement efforts. 11 For example, White (1996) obtains the similar result in terms of outputs of public and private firms in mixed oligopolies, but Gil-Molto et al. (2011), and Haruna and Goel (2017) obtain different results from White (1996) .
The second-order conditions for maximization of both firms are satisfied. On the abatement plane, (z 0 , z 1 ) , the environmental R&D reaction curves of the firms both slope downward, and the R&D equilibrium is given by their intersection and is locally stable. We note from (7) and (8) that the environmental R&D of the public (private) firm is a strategic substitute for the private (public) firm for any spillover rates. 12
When we solve the first-order conditions (7) and (8), the pollution abatements of firms are derived as:
The public firm undertakes environmental R&D, i.e., z 0 > 0 , for any γ , d, and β, while the private firm may or may not: The sign of (10) is dependent on its numerator, since the denominator is positive. Thus, the environmental R&D levels of firms are different, z 0 ≠ z 1 . The positive response of the public firm to pollution abatement is due to social welfare maximization being its objective.
We turn to the private firm's emissions abatement behavior. It follows (10) that 13
We call γ (d, β ) a critical efficiency value of environmental R&D technology, which is increasing in spillover rates. Since a public firm behaves more aggressively than a private firm in the R&D game and the environmental R&D of the public firm is a strategic substitute for the private firm, the private firm may have no incentive to make R&D investment.
It is not easy to know whether the private firm undertakes environmental R&D.
Let us specify the area in which z 1 is positive by a numerical example. In Figure   1 it becomes negative, specifically, the corner solution holds, for the efficiency of environmental R&D technology in a fairly large area. 15 As shown, an increase in R&D spillovers leads to greater incentive for the private firm to free ride on R&D of the public firm. We note that whether an interior or a corner R&D solution holds in the first state depends significantly on the degree of research spillovers.
However, the efficiency of R&D technology and the extent of social damage have fairly weak impacts on R&D behavior of the private firm.
Insert Figure 1 around here>>> Then, it follows that the equilibrium environmental R&D effort of the public firm is given by (9), i.e., z 0 * , in the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) and that of the private firm is given by (10) and becomes positive, i.e., z 1
14 Figure 1 and the remaining figures are plotted using Mathematica. 15 We have the area of z 1 < 0 for γ ≤ 3.5.
Then we obtain the following proposition. Let us turn to the equilibrium values of an emissions tax and outputs in the second and third stages, successively. First of all, when substituting (9) and (10) into (5), we have the following emissions taxes in the R&D interior and corner solutions of the SPNE, respectively:
where A denotes the denominator of (9). The signs of t ** and t * depend on the numerators of (11) and (12), respectively. When the amount of total pollution abatement is large, the government employs lower emissions taxes since the incentive for it to decrease pollution emissions becomes less. Now it follows from Proposition 1 and (5) 
and (iii) an emissions subsidy ( t ** < 0 ) for 16
(2) In the R&D corner equilibrium, the optimal environmental policy is (i) an emissions tax ( t
(ii) laissez-faire ( t * = 0 ) for 16 Bárcena-Ruiz and Garzon (2006) and Kato (2011) derive a different result that the optimal policy of the government is emissions taxes in mixed oligopolies.
and (iii) an emissions subsidy ( t
We turn to the policy of the government in the R&D corner solution. In Figure Next, when substituting (9) and (10) into (6), we obtain the following SPNE outputs of the public and private firms in the R&D interior and corner solutions:
17 When we illustrate figures, parameter a , representing the market size, is excluded. 18 We are unable to illustrate a figure by separating z ** with z 1 * > 0 from z ** with z 1 * < 0 .
We find from (6) that q i ** > q i
It is meaningful to conduct comparative statics to consider the effects of both the efficiency of environmental R&D technology and related spillovers. First of all, let us take the effect of the efficiency of R&D technology. In the R&D interior solution case, when its efficiency improves, i.e., parameter γ declines, both firms increase environmental R&D efforts (because the interior equilibrium solution is shifted outward on the R&D plane of (z 0 , z 1 ) as the R&D reaction curve of the public firm turns counterclockwise and that of the private firm turns clockwise, since the marginal R&D costs of both firms decline). 19 Consequently, total pollution abatement is increased. This increased pollution abatement then leads to reduced tax rates (or raised subsidy rates), and to an increase in each firm's output. On the other hand, in the R&D corner solution case, improved R&D technology leads to an increase in the emissions abatement of the public firm.
Hence, the same effects on taxes and the outputs of the public and private firms as in the interior solution hold. Secondly, with increased spillovers, the R&D reaction curve of the public firm turns counterclockwise and that of the private firm shifts down at least for d ≥ 1, so that the interior solution of R&D is shifted right/downward. Consequently, the public firm increases environmental R&D effort, but the private firm reduces it. It is, therefore, ambiguous whether total pollution abatement (z ** ) is increased or not by such increased spillovers. In contrast, increased spillover rates lead to increased total pollution abatement in the R&D corner solution case. This increase causes a decline (a rise) in the emissions tax (subsidy) and hence an increase in the outputs of the public and private firms. 20 Consequently, the SPNEs with the R&D interior solution and with the R&D corner solution are intermingled at each spillover rate. However, in the reasonable domain of (d, γ ) , we have SPNE with the former solution, (z ** , t ** , q ** ) , at a high percentage in the absence of spillovers, while we have SPNE with the latter solution, (z * , t * , q * ) , at high percentage in the ERJV ( β = 1 ). 19 In the R&D corner solution, this reduction causes the public firm to make an environmental R&D effort. 20 It follows from (5) that dt / dβ = ∂t / ∂β + (∂t / ∂z)(∂z / ∂β ) , where ∂t / ∂β < 0 and ∂t / ∂z < 0 .
and
2 .
Having dealt with mixed duopoly, we consider the case of the traditional duopoly that occurs when the public firm is privatized. This happens when governments take privatization policy to improve efficiency by increasing competitiveness or to raise funds.
Privatization and comparisons
We proceed to consider the effect of privatization of a public firm on market performance. Then the public firm 0 is privatized. We examine how the environmental R&D and output of the firm, emissions taxes, and net emissions are influenced by privatization.
First, we deal with the maximization problem of private firms in the third stage. The first-order condition for profit maximization of firm i (= 0, 1) is given as follows:
When assuming the symmetry, q i = q j , we have the output of firm i ,
Then the welfare function is reduced to
where E = 2q i − (1+ β )z. The first-order condition for welfare maximization of the government in the second stage is given by
Hence we get the emissions taxes for any z :
Equation (14) is the same as (5) in the mixed duopoly. It follows from (14) that
When substituting (14) into the output,
, we have the following output of the private firm for any z :
Equation (15) is the same as (6). We notice from (5), (6), (14), and (15) that the emissions taxes and outputs of both firms in the mixed duopoly are the same as in the private duopoly, for given z . Thus the following lemma holds.
Lemma 2. The emissions taxes and firm outputs in mixed and private duopolies are the same for any z , and their levels finally depend on total pollution abatements in each duopoly. 21 Next, we derive the first-order condition for profit maximization of firm i in the first stage. Differentiating the profit function with respect to the environmental R&D effort of firm i and arranging it by using (13), (14), (15), and the symmetry assumption yields
Finally, we obtain the environmental R&D effort of firm i in the SPNE:
where superscript + stands for the equilibrium value in the private duopoly. The private firm always performs environmental R&D in the first stage to reduce emissions as long as d ≥ 1 / 2 , different from the private firm in a mixed duopoly.
Increased spillover rates lead to increased environmental R&D efforts of the firms and an improvement in R&D technology leads to increased ones. Substituting total pollution abatement z (14), we have the emissions tax (subsidy) in the SPNE:
Given d ≥ 2 , the government adopts emissions taxes (t + > 0) , while whether it levies taxes on emissions for 1 / 2 < d < 2 is ambiguous as follows: Given 1 / 2 < d < 2 , the environmental policy of the government is (i) an emissions tax Bárcena-Ruiz and Garzon (2006) show that the outputs of firms in both a mixed oligopoly and a private oligopoly are different.
; and (iii) an emissions subsidy (t
. This result is summarized as follows:
Proposition 3.
(1) Given 1 / 2 < d < 2 , the optimal environmental policy of the government is (i) an emissions tax for
laissez-faire for γ = 2d(2 − d)(1+ β ) 2 / (3 + 2d)(2d − 1) , and (iii) an emissions subsidy
environmental policy is an emissions tax.
In (15) and (17) we obtain the outputs of the private firms in the SPNE:
Now an increase in the efficiency of R&D technology leads to increased environmental R&D efforts (dz i + / dγ > 0). It follows from this result, and (18) that an increase in its efficiency, further, leads to decreased emissions taxes and increased outputs (dt + / dγ < 0 and dq i + / dγ > 0). These results are the same as in the mixed duopoly. On the other hand, we cannot get a definite effect of an increase in spillovers on the environmental R&D effort. However, there is every possibility that an increase in spillovers leads to a decrease in the environmental R&D efforts of the firms: Its increase will then cause emissions taxes to increase, but outputs to decrease. 22 This is the inverse of the effect of the efficiency of environmental R&D technology.
The profits of the firm i (= 0, 1) and welfare in the SPNE are reduced to, respectively,
where p
We examine the effects of privatization. First, let us make a comparison of pollution abatements (environmental R&D efforts) before and after privatization of a public firm, i.e., z 0 * and z 0 + . It is difficult to mathematically compare them, − z 0 + is positive for all range, i.e., a non-privatized firm undertakes more pollution abatement than its privatized counterpart. This is because an increase in environmental R&D leads to larger an increase in welfare for a public firm than an increase in profit for a private firm. A difference between their R&D efforts gets large around small γ , as shown. It seems that the degree of the difference is reduced as R&D technology advances.
Insert Figure４around here>>>
Let us turn to a comparison of emissions taxes, outputs of firms, and net emissions in the mixed and private duopolies. From (5), (6), (14), (15), and the definition of the net emissions, the following relationships for the emissions taxes and outputs in the mixed duopoly with an R&D interior solution and in the private duopoly are established
where E ** = e 0 (q 0 ** , z 0 ** ) + e 1 (q 1 ** , z 1 ** ) and E + = e 0 (q 0 + , z 0 + ) + e 1 (q 1 + , z 1 + ). In addition, the same relationships also hold for the emissions taxes, the outputs and net emissions, and total pollution abatement in the mixed duopoly with the R&D corner solution and in the private duopoly. Then it follows from (19), (20), and (21) that the following proposition holds immediately:
Proposition 4.
(1) In the mixed duopoly with the R&D interior solution, 24
(2) In the mixed duopoly with the R&D corner solution,
This result shows that in the end, the relationships of emissions taxes, outputs, and net emissions under a mixed duopoly and a private duopoly come down to total pollution abatement.
Now it is difficult to compare total pollution abatement in the mixed duopoly with an R&D interior solution with that in the private duopoly. We take the relatively easy mixed duopoly case of the R&D corner solution, i.e., z 1 * = 0 , but even in this case it is difficult to mathematically specify even the relationship of 
Conclusions
This paper examines optimal pollution abatement under mixed oligopoly when firms engage in emissions-reducing R&D that is imperfectly appropriable. Mixed oligopolies are common in instances when governments partially privatize public sector undertakings or governments enter private markets to increase competition or offer alternatives. The regulator uses a tax to curb emissions.
Firms' behavior under partial privatization is compared to the case of full privatization (i.e., private competition). While some scholars in the literature have considered similar aspects (e.g., Poyago-Theotoky (2007)), our treatment of the issues involved in more general in some respects. At a broader level, this research may be seen in the context of some of the issues of technological change and environmental policy noted by Jaffe et al. (2002) and others (e.g., Goel and Hsieh (2006) ).
Results show that in a mixed oligopoly, the public firm engages in positive emissions reduction in equilibrium; however, the emissions reductions of the private firm could be positive, negative or zero. In contrast, Bárcena-Ruiz and
Garzon (2006), Gil-Molto and Varvarigos (2014) , and Kato (2011) show that a private firm undertakes emissions abatement in a mixed oligopoly. Under full privatization, the optimal pollution tax is positive when marginal emissions control expenditures rise sharply or marginal pollution damage is high; otherwise, the tax reverts to a subsidy.
Comparing mixed and private duopolies, privatization leads to reductions in environmental R&D and output, but to an increase in overall emissions. Thus, privatization tends to make the environment worse. This finding underscores the policy challenges of designing effective pollution control in the presence of research and environmental spillovers and call into question blanket recommendations that unequivocally espouse the virtues of privatization. The environmental effects and policy design becomes even more challenging when emissions are durable with impacts that linger over time (Goel and Hsieh (2004) ).
The other policy take from the results is that pollution taxes may not always be the optimal policy to curb emissions and that subsidies might be the recommended path in some cases. The overall results add to the ongoing theoretical efforts to get a better handle on effect measures to combat environmental degradation. Obviously, these efforts would benefit from some empirical verification that is often constrained by the availability of appropriate data. 
